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Killing the Messenger: An Experimental Analysis of the Hostile Media Effect
Jeanette Moreho use Mendez
Oklahoma State University
According
to the Pew Research
Center, 65% of the
American public perceives that the news media are biased (2004). This paper looks at the hostile media effectthe theory that individuals
assume media bias against
them (Vallone, Ross and leper I 985). The results from an
experiment with 325 undergraduates
have several implications regarding the role of political information.
First,
the hostile media effect is not consistently
supportedthat is, perceptions
of bias result from actual content,
with individuals
responding to media messages with the
assumption
of bias, but not of bias linked to partisanship. When the expectations
of the hostile media effect
are supported, the results show a larger effect for Republicans, not Democrats (Beck et al. 2002: Mutz and Martin
2001). Second, respondents
tend to rate the reporter as
fair when content is balanced and unfair when content is
disparate or one-sided;
when they do perceive a bias,
partisan Democrats tend to kill the messenger and describe the reporter as unfair while partisan Republicans
tend to describe the reporter as fair. The present d_ata
indicate influences beyond partisanship
and offer alternative explanations for perceptions of bias.

I

n an age of growing cynicism about government and politics,
it is not surprising that roughly 65% of all respondents to a
PEW Research Center (2004) survey perceive a political bias
in news coverage. Researchers are currently studying the processes by which individuals interpret media content and bias (e.g.,
Eveland and Shah 2003; Lee 2005). Findings suggest that inter-
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personal factors, such as a person's discussion network, ideology,
and pa1tisanship, affect perceptions of bias . Given the strength of
association between partisanship and its effect on individual decision-making, partisanship might best explain the discrepancy
between perceived bias and actual bias.
The hostile media effect explains the gap between actual
media content and perceptions of bias in content. Its basic premise is that partisans interpret media content as opposed to their
views when in fact it is balanced among viewpoints (Vallone,
Ross and Lepper 1985). However, the theory (and recent research) fails to consider bias perceptions when media content is
not balanced. For example, Dalton, Beck and Huckfeldt (1998)
found that the news media present multiple, conflicting, and disparate messages regardless of whether or not content is biased.
Dalton et al. ( 1998) refer to bias as that which is imposed intentionally by the journalist, which is different than others who define bias in terms of shear positive and negative tone of the
article (e.g. Stempel and Windhauser I 991 ). The multiple definitions of bias available have led to conflicting measures and results.
Given the current climate concerning media bias, both in
terms of the public perceiving bias, and journalists arguing its
very existence, an examination of the effects of content on
evaluations of bias is extremely timely. Further, since partisanship is a widely used heuristic in decision making, what happens
when one relies on partisanship as a heuristic to evaluate media
content? ls it true, as the hostile media effect suggests that partisanship will cloud one's judgment? Using the hostile media effect as a framework, one might predict that disparate, or onesided, messages would be easiest to project a bias onto because
the content itself presents opposing viewpoints. If so, the potential for perceived media bias may be greater than previously
thought. Therefore, an examination of both balanced and dispaVOL.
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rate messages is important to fully understand the extent to
which perceptions of bias are actual or projected.
INFORMATIONPROCESSINGBIAS:
THE HOSTILEMEDIA EFFECT

Vallone et al. ( 1985) confirmed the existence of the hostile
media effect in the form of attitude influenced processing and
different standards. According to attitude-influenced processing,
partisans make evaluative judgments about media content based
on their predisposed beliefs rather than actual content (Chaiken,
Liberman and Eagly 1989; Tversky and Kahneman 1982). A perceptual bias can occur when partisans who are predisposed to
skepticism and searching for disagreeable content report unequal
amounts of negative content toward their preferred positions
(Gunther, Christen, Liebhart and Chia 200 I). According to the
different standards approach, partisans view balanced coverage
as being biased based on their belief that their superior viewpoint
should receive more favorable coverage than other viewpoints
(Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken 1993). Depending on the situational
context, either process can be used to explain why an objectively
balanced newscast can be interpreted as biased by partisans.
There is also support for the hostile media effect in terms of
political party affiliation. Dalton et al. ( 1998) examined perceptions of newspaper content during the 1992 presidential election
and found that strong Republican supporters tended to describe
newspapers as biased in favor of Bill Clinton and strong Democratic supporters described the same newspapers as favoring
George H. W. Bush. However, the conclusions of Dalton et al.
( 1998) were based on a single variable for party identification
and the results were interpreted as an effect of both ends (Democrats and Republicans) of the variable. According to Beck,
Dalton, Greene and Huckfeldt (2002) and Mutz and Martin
(200 I), the results instead might support the basic premise that
TIIE JOURNAL
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Democrats generally hold favorable opinions of the press (accounting for the lower percentage of respondents who stated that
the press favored Bush) and Republicans are generally critical of
the media (explaining the larger percentage of respondents reporting a pro-Clinton bias). Therefore it is Republicans, and not
Democrats, who are more susceptible to the hostile media effect.
The previous research has provided mixed support for the
hostile media effect in terms of partisanship. Further, the majority of the experimental evidence has been based on balanced
content, meaning partisans are exposed to content where neither
group is given more positive or negative coverage than the other
group. For example, if two candidates are running for office and
both support campaign finance reform, the balanced article describes these similar viewpoints while giving equal coverage to
each candidate in terms of tone and content (both candidates are
presented as moral). However, balanced content is not the only
type of content that can exist. Therefore, this study examines the
hostile media effect under a different situation- that of disparate
media content, which actually is more likely to occur in a real
world situation.
Disparate content refers to coverage that is one-sided- more
or less positive for one group compared to coverage for the other
group. Again, while some scholars have defined this as biased,
this study avoids that evaluation and simply refers to this content
as disparate. For example, if two candidates are running for office and each has a different viewpoint in terms of campaign finance reform, an article with disparate coverage would use the
differing opinions to give more favorable coverage to one candidate (the candidate is described moral) over the other candidate
(the candidate is described as corrupt). Such an article could give
positive coverage to the candidate who supports campaign finance reform, while giving more negative treatment to the candidate who opposes reform.
VOL.
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EXPECTATIONS OF THE HOSTILE MEDIA EFFECT

To test the effects of partisanship on perceptions of bias under balanced and disparate media content, this study uses the
theory of the hostile media effect to generate hypotheses for both
situations. First, in terms of balanced coverage, previous evidence shows that respondents report balanced coverage as biased. In particular when groups were given the same balanced
content to watch, partisans evaluated the balanced content as
biased. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
HJ: Partisans will evaluate all balanced content as biased against
their preferred side .

Balanced coverage is not the only type of content that can
appear in the media; however, within the examination of the hostile media effect, the presence of disparate coverage has not been
examined. Although previously unexamined, the theory of the
hostile media effect can be used to generate expectations for
situations of disparate messages. The hostile media effect states
that partisans will always assume a bias for the other side, unless
the partisan's preferred side receives more positive coverage,
which actually can happen in disparate coverage. ln disparate
coverage, the partisan will report no bias exists because his or
her side is favored and this is the only acceptable condition for a
partisan. Remember, the only acceptable (and thus considered
unbiased) situation is when the partisan group receives more favorable coverage, anything else is considered by the partisan as
biased. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
HZ: Partisans will evaluate disparate coverage favoring their side as
unbiased because they find the imbalance in favor of their side
as the only acceptable situation; and

H3: Partisans will evaluate disparate coverage favoring the opposition as biased because the content is seen as unacceptable .
TIIE JOURNAL
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In addition to these expectations based on balanced and disparate content, I expect the hostile media effect to be more likely
when content is disparate compared to when content is balanced.
Disparate content presents two conflicting points of view, which
makes it easier for respondents to recognize an imbalance and
perceive a bias. Given that people are limited information processors, situations that make the end result (perception of bias)
easier to achieve are desirable. Balanced content will still result
in perception of bias, but to arrive at this, partisans will have to
make more of an effort to justify the perception. Therefore I hypothesize that:
H4: The hostile media effect to be more likely under situations of
disparate content compared to situations of balanced content.

The above expectations center around perceptions of media
content, where the hostile media effect can be tested in terms of
the extent to which respondents perceived media content as biased. The hostile media effect can also be assessed by how a partisan evaluates journalistic balance and fairness . For example,
A rad and Carnevale ( 1994) reported that partisans gave higher
ratings to mediators who ruled in favor of their argument than to
neutral mediators or mediators who ruled in favor of the opposing side. Similarly, the evaluation of the journalist will be based
on the respondent's perception of the article content, as well as
partisanship. Democrats and Republicans will assume journalists
do not favor their preferred side. The hostile media effect assumes partisans will not recognize bias for their preferred side
because they would find any favorable imbalance and acceptable
and report this as unbiased; however partisans should report bias
for the opposition in all other situations and, since this is considered unacceptable, I hypothesize that partisans will penalize the
journalist in these situations. Accordingly, applying the hostile
media effect to journalistic evaluations raises the following hypotheses:
\ '01..
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HS: Partisans will describe all journalists that do not treat their side
most favorably as unfair
H6: Partisans who perceive a bias for the opposition will evaluate

the journalist as unfair
H7: Partisans who perceive a bias in favor of the opposition will

evaluate the journalist as unfair.
BEYOND INFORMATION PROCESSING BIASES:
ACTUAL MEDIA BIASES

Having used the hostile media effect to generate expectations, it is important to note that other explanations might prevail. Namely, the current political and media climate in society
could influence evaluations. While there is ample discussion in
the mainstream as to if bias exists, there is a debate among political scientists regarding this. Though not an exhaustive list,
researchers who have documented a liberal media bias include
Efron ( 197 I), Keely ( 1971 ), and Bozell and Baker ( 1990). Researchers who have documented a conservative media bias include Liebling ( 1964), Cooper and Soley ( 1990), and Lee and
Solomon (1991). The list of researchers who claim that media
content is, on average, devoid of bias includes Hostetter (1976),
D' Alessio and Allen (2000), and Niven (2003). Finally, it must
be noted that the definition of "bias" remains contentious in current research and, therefore, disparities in the definition and
measurement of bias are likely leading to conflicting results.
The focus of mainstream debate on this issue concerns the
"existence" of a liberal bias, with a growing number of conservative commentators lamenting a bias that few liberals vehemently
refute. The current literature contains little information on the
extent to which this one-sided discourse preconditions individuals to assuming the existence of a liberal bias in the media reTl!E JOURN 1\ L
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gardless of actual content. Given conflicting evidence on the existence of bias, it is reasonable to speculate that perceptions of
bias are linked to the current discourse on the topic. Thus, the
hostile media effect might not best explain current partisan perceptions.
EXAMINING THE HOSTILE MEDIA EFFECT

This analysis looks at the effects of bias perceptions in media
coverage by using newspaper content of two candidates who
show positive support for the same issue or different viewpoints
that result in disparate coverage. For each scenario content for
both sides is included, in order to evaluate perceptions of bias of
one side compared to another side. This comparison could not be
made if content focused only on one side. The four coverage options are:
( I) lhe Democrat supports side A and U1eRepublican supports side B.
(2) the Democrat supports side Band the Republican supports side A.
(3) both candidates suppo1t side A. or
(4) both candidates support side B.

The articles are objective in nature because both the balanced content and disparate content is presented as factual and
devoid of any intent to prefer one side over the other ( e.g. Dalton
et al. 1998). Unbiased content was purposefully used in all four
scenarios, yet the research assumption dictated that readers
would project a bias onto the story source depending on the issue
and how each side was presented. For instance, if side A was
presented as moral and correct and side B as corTupt and unjust,
the hostile media effect states that supporters of both candidates
would report biases for all content scenarios except when their
favored candidate supported side A and the other supported side
B. In those situations, it was assumed that the partisan would
VOL.
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describe the positive coverage of their candidate (moral versus
corrupt) as fair and balanced.
A controlled survey experiment was designed to examine
information processing and the hostile media effect given certain
expectations and content scenarios. The Fal I 200 I experiment
was conducted with 325 undergraduate students who voluntarily
participated for extra credit for two introductory political science
courses at a large Midwestern university. The use of students is
sometimes challenged in experimental research. However, given
the reported lack of partisan attachment in younger individuals,
the results obtained from this analysis might be weaker than the
results that would be drawn from a sample consisting of older
non-students.
Data were collected via a computerized survey containing 6
knowledge questions, 2 party identification questions, a fabricated newspaper article, 5 questions designed to measure the
extent to which accurate or biased information processing occurred, 14 candidate trait evaluation questions, and 10 questions
designed to assess the favorability of the candidates. Follow-up
questions were included to measure evaluation intensity.
The survey software randomly assigned newspaper articles
to each participant: Students were told that each article was
taken from a newspaper covering two congressional candidates,
one Democrat and one Republican. They were also told that each
candidate had a particular stance (side A or side 8) on campaign
finance reform as it concerns political action committees. Article
content varied according to the four scenarios described above.
The disparate articles presented one candidate supporting side A
and the other side B; the neutral articles presented both candidates as supporting side A or B.

• Appendix A presents each of the four newspaper anicles .
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Side A and B content were identical for all articles . The tone
of information for Side A was positive, with the candidate described as a moral citizen who supported campaign finance reform, who rejected donations from political action committees,
and who refused to be "bought" by corporate interests. The tone
of information for side B was negative, with the candidate described as someone who was beholden to corporate interests,
who had amassed a large war chest, and who opposed campaign
finance reform.
The scenarios can be justified for three reasons . First, the
experiment occurred in fall 200 I, following the terrorist attacks ,
when many believed bipartisanship characterized the political
mood. Also, at this time, the McCain-Feingold Act , a bipartisan
campaign reform act , was rapidly gaining in popularity. Second,
the articles were clearly written in language intended to convey
positive and negative cues . For example , the phrase , "taking
back power from special interests '' would have a negative connotation for those opposed to reform. Lastly, and most importantly,
a separate sample of 119 undergraduate students received sections of the articles to read, with the candidate names and party
identifications omitted . For each , they identified the content as
positive or negative. The results show that 87% of the respondents identified content where the candidate supports campaign
finance reform as positive and 97% reported content where the
candidate opposes campaign finance reform as negative. Therefore, while some might argue classifying all pro-reform content
as positive conflates the positive /negative information with issue
positions for campaign finance reform, these results show students do identify pro-reform content as positive content and antireform content as negative, irrespective of issue positions.
For these three reasons, information is considered positive
when the candidate supports reform and negative when the candidate opposes it. This creates two neutral content situations , in
\ ' 0 1,.
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which each candidate has the same viewpoint, and two disparate
content situations, with one favoring the Democratic candidate
(the Democratic candidate receives positive coverage and the
Republican candidate receives negative coverage), and one favoring the Republican candidate (the Republican candidate receives positive coverage and the Democratic candidate receives
negative coverage).
Two dependent variables were used to measure perceptions
of bias and the hostile media effect. Similar to Vallone et al.
( 1985), bias was assessed by asking respondents, "Which candidate do you think the newspaper favored in the article you read,
or did it not favor either candidate?" Responses were coded as 0
for a perceived Democratic bias, I for no perceived bias, and 2
for a perceived Republican bias. This question serves as an assessment of bias because previous research has defined bias as a
situation in which a candidate is favored in terms of content (e.g.
Stempel and Windhauser I 991 ). The hostile media effect was
also evaluated in terms of the perceived fairness of the reporter,
using the question "How fair-minded would you rate the journalist who wrote this article?" Responses were given along a Likerttype scale in which I was coded as "very unfair" and 7 "very
fair."
The primary independent variables in this analysis were the
message content of the newspaper article and partisanship. Message content was measured using dummy variables if the respondent read one of the four articles-I
if an article was read, 0
if not. Three dummy variables were used with the four articles,
with the balanced and negative content category excluded.
Partisanship was measured via answers to the National Election Studies questions that were included in the survey. Responses were given along a seven point Likert-type scale, with I
being "strong Democrat" and 7 "strong Republican." Party identification was considered important to testing the hostile media
'J'JJE JOURNAL
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effect, since it was assumed that partisans would perceive biases
in media content based on their political preferences. Further, a
method was needed to confirm a minimum degree of equal distribution of the four articles in terms of party identification in
order to control analytical bias. The party identification distribution data indicate that partisanship was even across the sample
and across treatment groups. Additionally, interactive effects of
message content and partisanship were used as independent variables to analyze the extent to which the participants responded to
a particular stimulus (type and tone of content). It is reasonable
to expect partisans to respond differently to different stimuli and
this can not be understood without an interactive effect.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The first set of hypotheses address how message content affects the way that partisans perceive media content. Using the
hostile media effect, hypotheses were generated for perceptions
of bias when content is balanced and when it is disparate. Partisans will perceive a bias against their preferred position unless
the article content was clearly more favorable toward their side,
in which case they would report zero bias. Therefore, balanced
content should result in perceptions of bias, while disparate content will result in perceptions of bias when content is negative
for the preferred candidate and perceptions of no bias when content is positive for the preferred candidate. Also, while perceptions of bias should occur in both situations, balanced and
disparate content, I posit perceptions of bias will be more likely
when content is disparate rather than when content is balanced,
because the disparity will be easy to recognize and project a bias
onto. To test for this, an ordered logit analysis was conducted
with perception of bias as the dependent variable. Perception of
bias is coded as O for a perceived Democratic bias, I for no perceived bias, and 2 for a perceived Republican bias. The indeVOL.

35 2007

42

MENDEZ

pendent variables included in the analysis are partisanship and
dummy variables for which article the respondent read. Results
from this analysis are shown in Table I.

Table 1
Logit Regression Results: Effects of Partisanship and
Media Content on Perceptions of Media Bias
Coefficient
-0.03
-2.02t
0.94i
-1.04 i
0. 17
0.01
-0.99
0.94
66.55+
N
323

Variables

Party identification
Positive content for Democrat
Positive content for Republican
Positive content for both candidates
Positive content for Democrat*party identification
Positive content for Republiean•party identification
Threshold I
Threshold 2
LR Chi2
Significance

(SE)
(0 .09)
(0.62)
(0.57)
(0.56)
(0.14)
(0.13)
(0.38)
(0.38)

i p<0.10, t p<0.001

Results indicate that content and party identification affect perceptions of bias. The magnitude of this relationship is best explained through predicted probabilities of perceptions of bias for
strong partisans, since the hostile media effect should be greatest
for them (Table la).• The study will first examine the effects
when content is balanced, then when content is disparate and
lastly the study will draw comparisons between these scenarios.

• Probabilities were also generated for weak partisans and the results show consistency
across the panisanship scale as expected by the hostile media effect. Strong panisans
show larger probabilities, on average 0.05 compared to weak partisans . Therefore , given
that the hostile media effect aims to explain the behavior of strong panisans , I report
those in the text. When weak and strong panisans are collapsed into one group , the probabilities are on average 0.025 lower than found for strong panisans . Additional probabilities can be provided by the author upon request.
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TABLE la
Predicted Probabilities of Assessment of Bias for
Strong Partisans Based on Newspaper Article Content

Assessment
of bias
Democratic
bias
No bias
Republican
bias
N
Democratic
bias
No bias

Newseaeer Article Content
Balanced Content
Disparate Content
+ Democrat - Democrat
+ Democrat
- Democrat
- Reeublican + Reeublican + Reeublican - Reeublican
Strong Democrats

0.71
(0.54, 0.87)
0.23

(0. I 1, 0.36}
0.06
(0.01, 0.102
16
0.51
(0.31, 0.71}

0.37
(0.31, 0.71)
0. 12
(0.03, 0.212
II

0.12
(0.05. 0.21)
0.38
(0.27. 0.48)

0.51
(0.35, 0.68}
0.37
(0.26. 0.47)

0.28
(0. 16, 0.402
0.45
(0.39, 0.51)

0.50
(0.32, 0.67}

0.12
(0.04, 0.20}

0.27
(0.15, 0.39}

10

13

16

Strong Reeublicans
0.14
0.51
(0.05, 0.23)
(0.35, 0.68}
0.37
0.39
(0.26, 0.47)
(0.29, 0.49}

0.32
(0.16, 0.48}

0.44
{0. I6. 0.48)
0.24
{0.10,0.37}
II

0.47
0.12
Republican
bias
(0.29, 0.65)
(0.04. 0.202
N
17
17
Note: Figures represent predicted probabilities obtained from Table I estimates . Confidence intervals are in parentheses. Newspaper article content: +
= positive coverage, - = negative coverage . Assessment of bias refers lo
which candidate, if any, was perceived as favored. Figures in bold font are
expectations based on the hostile media effect.

Balanced Content
In terms of balanced content , remember that partisans are
expected to report bias in favor of the opposition , both when the
balance is positive for both candidates and when the content is
negative toward both candidates. This is because partisans are to
VOL.
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assume all content is biased unless the content is more favorable
for their preferred side. As the probabilities show, this is not necessarily true. Strong Democrats have a 0.12 probability of reporting a Republican bias when content is balanced and positive, and
a 0.27 probability of reporting a Republican bias when content is
balanced and negative. Clearly this does not support the hostile
media effect. On the other hand, strong Republicans are more
likely to conform to the hostile media effect, though the results
are not overwhelming. trong Republicans have a 0.51 probability of reporting a Democratic bias when content is balanced and
positive, and a 0.32 probability of reporting a Democratic bias
when content is balanced and negative. These probabilities do
not indicate widespread support of the hostile media effect, but
they do show strong Republicans are more likely to conform to
the hostile media effect compared to strong Democrats. This result is in line with recent evidence of the hostile media effect in a
real world setting where party identification is examined (Mutz
and Martin 200 I; Beck et al. 2002).
Overall, in terms of balanced content, only moderate support
is found for the hostile media effect, and this applies to strong
Republicans, but not strong Democrats. Instead, the results suggest partisans assess positive and negative information differently, rather than assessing all balanced content, regardless of
tone, as biased. When article content is balanced and positive,
both strot1g Democrats and strong Republicans have a 0.51 probability of reporting a Democratic bias. This shows a hostile media effect for strong Republicans, but not for strong Democrats.
When content is balanced and negative, both strong Democrats and strong Republicans are more likely to report no bias (0.
44 and 0.45, respectively). A possible explanation for this finding
is the presence of a projection effect according to current discourse in which partisans assume a liberal media bias when content is favorable to both candidates. Thus, when a message is
TIIE JOUR
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ferred candidate. It is hard to argue that the negative Republican
content stood out in contrast to the positive Democratic content,
and led to a perception of a Democratic bias by strong Democrats. Rather, strong Democrats respond to the positive information about the Democratic candidate and report a Democratic
bias. The same is true for strong Republicans- positive Republican content leads to a perception of a Republican bias.
Overall, the evidence in terms of disparate content is mixed.
When the disparity favors the preferred candidate, partisans recognize the actual content and report a bias for the preferred candidate. When the disparity favors the opposition, the hostile
media effect is more likely. Interestingly, partisans equate disparity with bias, though this study refrains from calling these articles biased because there are objective reasons why disparity can
exist.

Comparisons between Neutral and Disparate Content
The hostile media effect will be more likely when content is
disparate as opposed to balanced because the disparity allows
respondents to easily notice that one side is favored over the
other. Therefore, rather than projecting a bias that does not exist,
partisans assume disparity is bias. Remember, this study does not
evaluate disparity as bias because there could be objective reasons for the disparity, such as how the campaigns are run (e.g.
Dalton et al. 1998). Comparing the probabilities between balanced and disparate situations does show that partisans conform
to the expectations of the hostile media effect more so when content is disparate, as predicted; however, support for the expectations is quite modest. When content is disparate and negative for
the preferred candidate, the hostile media effect prevailed for
both strong Democrats and strong Republicans (0.50 and 0.51 ),
but not in the other disparate condition (0.23 and 0.39). However, when the articles were balanced, the only evidence of a
THE JOURNAi.
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balanced but negative, pa1tisans recognize the negative tone and
fail to report either candidate as favored, regardless of their general perception of a mainstream media bias. This study cannot
offer a conclusion on this point because the respondents were not
asked to express their opinions regarding bias in the mainstream
media. Further research is required to test whether a factor other
than information processing biases (e.g., a hostile media effect or
motivated reasoning) can be used to explain perceptions of bias.
Overall, when content is balanced, Republicans are more likely
than Democrats to perceive a bias and conform to the hostile
media effect, though the probabilities are not overwhelmingly
large in support of this. Further , partisans assess information differently, depending on tone.

Disparate Cont ent
In situations of disparate coverage , partisans are expected to
report no bias if their side is favored (since they consider this the
only acceptable situation) and biased if their side receives anything less than this . First, in terms of disparate coverage that is
negative for the preferred candidate , both strong Democrats and
strong Republicans report this as biased for the opposition (0.50
and 0.51, respectively) . This does show there is a hostile media
effect for partisans in th is cond ition . On the other hand, when
content is disparate and negative for the opposition , neither
strong Democrats nor strong Republicans have large probabilities of conforming to the hostile media effect and reporting no
bias (0.23 and 0.39 , respectively). Interestingly , in both of these
situations, strong Democrats and strong Republicans evaluate the
negative opposition content , and positive preferred candidate
content, as just that. Thus, Democrats report the content as biased for Democrats (0.71) and Republicans report the content
biased for Republicans (0.47). Most likely one type of message
is resonating with respondents- the positive content for the preVO L . 35 2007
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hostile media effect is for strong Republicans, when the article is
balanced and positive. Rather, both sets of partisans are at ti"mes
able to equally recognize actual content, yet in some situations a
Democratic bias is assumed for both sets of partisans even when
not true. This finding suggests that current discourse concerning
a " liberal media" might actually have an effect on perceptions of
media bias. Both Democrats and Republicans report the Democrat as favored when content is favorable for the Democrat, even
in the balanced situation.
Overall, the expectation that the hostile media effect is more
likely when content is disparate is supported , though not in both
cases of disparity . Instead , the tone of the content and the recipient of the content seem to influence the results more so than the
hostile media effect.

Reporter Evaluation
As a further test of bias perception , respondents evaluated
the fairness of the reporter. The hostile media effect suggests
that: (a) unless their side is given most favorable coverage , partisans will perceive all coverage as unfair; and (b) when partisans
of one party or the other perceive a bias , they will describe the
reporter as unfair if the bias supports the other candidate . Given
the results of the previous section , there is evidence that partisans do report bias for their preferred side , which the hostile media effect does not predict. In these situations, one would expect
perception of bias for the preferred side to be acceptable for partisans , since they prefer positive content for their candidate, and
one would expect partisans in this situation to report the journalist as fair.

VOL. 35 2007
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To assess these expectations, this study used an ordered logit
regression with reporter evaluation as the dependent variable.
Responses were given along a Likert-type scale in which I was
coded as "very unfair" and 7 ''very fair." The independent variables included those listed in Table I. Two dummy variables
were added-one each for perception of a Democratic or Republican bias. In each case, responses stating a perceived bias were
coded as I and responses indicating no perceived bias were
coded as 0. These variables address the effects of perception of
bias , which was found in the previous section, and hypothesized
to effect evaluations of the reporter. Further, this study employs
interaction terms from the multiplicative product of party identification and each dummy variable for perception of bias. The
interaction terms were included because perception of bias is
contingent on partisanship. Democrats who perceive a Democratic bias should evaluate reporters differently than Republicans
who perceive a Democratic bias. The results of the ordered logit
analysis are presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Logit Regressio n Results: Evaluations of Reporter Fairness based on
Partisa nship and Media Content
Coefficie nt

Variab les

(SE)

(0.67)
Party Identi ti cation
-0.06
(2.24)
Positive content for Democrat
-0 .80t
Positive content for Republican
-0.16
(0.47)
Positive content for both candidates
0.19
(0.56)
(3.44)
Perceived bias for Democrat
-192t
Perceived bias for Republican
(3.74)
-2.30t
Perceived Democratic bias*party identification
0.18
( 1.47)
Perceived Republican bias*party identification
( 1.67)
0.221
-2.02
(0.44)
Threshold I
-1.3 1
Threshold 2
(0.43)
LR Chi2
52.47+
N
323
Note: Z-scores for coefficients and standard errors for cut-points in parentheses.,t p<0.05. l p<0.10, t p<0.001 Reporter fairness: -I = somewhat unfair.
unfair, very unfair; 0 = neither fair nor unfair; + I = somewhat fair, fair. very
fair.
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The results indicate that reporter evaluations are affected by content, perceptions of bias and party identification and the interaction of party identification and perception of bias; however ,
mixed support for the hostile media effect is found. Overall , partisans do have some tendency to kill the messenger.
Table 2a presents probabilities of journalist ratings based on
partisanship and newspaper article content.
TABLE 2a
Predicted Probabilities of Rating the Journalist asUnfair and Fair for
StrongPartisans Based on Newspaper Article Content
Newseaeer Article Content
Balanced Content
Disparate Content
- Democrat
- Democrat
+ Democrat
+ Democrat
- Re[!ublican + Reeublican + Reeublican - Reeublican

Journalist
Rating

Strong Democrats
Fair
Unfair
N

0.42
(0.23, 0.59)
0.42
(0.23, 0.602
16

0.57
(0.40, 0.73)

0.27
(0.14, 0.412
10

0.65
(0.50 , 0.802
0.21
(0.10, 0.32)
13

0.61
(0.44, 0.77)
0.24
(0.11, 0.37)
16

Strong Republicans
Fair
Unfair
N

0.33
~0.17, 0.48)

o.so
(0.33. 0.68)
II

0.48
(0.30, 0.66)
0.35
(0.19, 0.51)
17

0.57
(0.40. 0.73)
0.27
(0.14, 0.41)
17

0.52
(0.33 . 0.71)

0.31
(0.15. 0.47)

II

Note: Figures repre sent predicted probabilitie s obtained from Table 2 estimate s. Confidence intervals in parentheses . Newspaper article content: + =
positive coverage, - = negative coverage. Unfair reporter rating: respon dent
described reporter as very unfair , unfair or somewhat unfair. Fair rating:
respondent described reporter as very fair, fair, or somewhat fair. Entries in
bold font based on expectations of the hostile media effect.
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Table 2b presents probabilities of journalist ratings based on
partisanship and perceptions of bias.
Table 2b
Predicted Probabilities of Partisans Rating Reporter as
Unfair or Fair Based on Perception of Newspaper Bias
Perceived Article Bias

Democrat
Strong Democrat
Fair
Unfair
N
Strong Republican
Fair
Unfair
N

Republican

0.34
(0.20, 0.48)
0.49
(0.34, 0.64)
24

0.27
(0. 12, 0.42)
0.57
(0.39, 0.76)
8

0.51
(0.36, 0.66)
0.32
(0.19, 0.45)
24

0.49
(0.31, 0.67)
0.34
(0. 17. 0.50)
15

Note: Figures represent predicted probabilities obtained from
Table 2 estimates . Confidence intervals are in parentheses .
" Unfair" rating means respondent described reporter as very
unfair , unfair , or somewhat unfair . "Fair" rating means respondent described reporter as very fair, fair. or somewhat
fair. Entries in bold type were based on expectations of the
hostile media effect.

Balanced Content
In terms of balanced coverage, where partisans should report
the journalist as unfair, because the situation is not acceptable,
both Democrats and Republicans report the journalist as fair,
both when content is balanced and positive (0.65 and 0.57 respectively) and balanced and negative (0.6 I and 0.52 respectively) . Partisans are more likely to evaluate balanced content as
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fair, not unfair, contrary to the hostile media effect. This result
could be anticipated for non-partisans, because balance should
imply neutrality and given journalistic standards, this should be
perceived as fair. Surprisingly, however, partisans also respond
to the overall balanced message and accept the balance and
evaluate journalists as fair.

Disparate Content
As anticipated, when content is disparate, there is more support for the hostile media effect. The expectation is that partisans
will evaluate the journalist as fair when the disparity favors the
preferred side and unfair when the disparity favors the opposition. First, when content is disparate and negative for the preferred candidate, Republicans do report the journalist as unfair
(0.50), while Democrats do so, but with a much lower probability (0.27). For Democrats, the current discourse could affect their
evaluations. In the mainstream debate about a "liberal" media,
people are told this is unfair and Democrats should not receive
favorable coverage. Perhaps in response to this, when Democrats
do receive negative coverage, Democrats find this acceptable.
This runs counter to the hostile media effect, and even to intuition, but it is one possibility that could later be explored.
When content is disparate and negative for the opposition
candidate, both Democrats and Republicans report this as fair, as
expected, though the probabilities do not exceed 0.50 (0.42 and
0.48 respectively). This suggests modest support for the hostile
media effect. However, even with these modest results, the hostile media effect receives more support when content is disparate
than when content is balanced. Further, strong Republicans are
more likely than strong Democrats to conform to the hostile media effect.
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Perceptions of Bias
This study initially anticipated that perceptions of bias would
affect reporter evaluations because partisans should evaluate a
reporter as fair if they perceive a bias in their preferred direction.
Otherwise, partisans will evaluate the journalist as unfair. When
perception of bias is taken into account, however, there is mixed
support for the hostile media effect (Table 2b). The results show
that Democrats who perceive a Republican bias do report the
journalist as unfair (0 .57 probability) and Republicans who perceive a Republican bias report the journalist as fair (0.49). However, when a Democratic bias is perceived, Democrats do not in
large part report the journalist as fair (0.34 probability) and Republicans do not in large part report the journalist as unfair (0 .32
probability) . Interestingly, Democrats are more likely to give an
unfavorable reporter evaluation regardless of the direction of
perceived bias, and partisan Republican s are more likely to give
a favorable evaluation regardless of the direction of perceived
bias. Could public discourse explain this? Perhaps. Democrats
might respond to outcries of media bias by evaluating any bias as
unfair , while Republicans might be resigned to accept what they
feel is a " liberal ' media . This is an interesting finding overall ,
even if it does not conform to expectations. Partisans are processing information differently and this is evident in terms of the
effects of perceptions of bias.
CONCLUSION

The results have several implications regarding the role of
political information. First , in many instances they do not support the hostile media effect - that is, perceptions of bias result
from actual content , with respondents reacting to the presence of
disparate content regardless of the lack of measurable bias.
When the expectations of the hostile media effect are supported ,
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the results show a larger effect for Republicans, not Democrats,
which recent evidence also supports (Beck et al. 2002; Mutz and
Martin 2001 ). Second, respondents tend to rate the reporter as
fair when content is balanced and unfair when content is disparate; when they do perceive a bias, partisan Democrats tend to
kill the messenger and describe the reporter as unfair while partisan Republicans tend to describe the reporter as fair.
The results provide important information as to the ways that
individuals respond to media content and project biases, especially in the context of disparate versus balanced information.
Whereas previous studies have suggested that partisanship affects perceptions of bias, the present data indicate influences beyond partisanship. One possible reason is the current national
discourse on liberal bias in the media. Eveland and Shah (2003)
found perceptions of bias to be linked not only to partisanship,
but to conversations with like-minded people. The influence of
communication networks is unexamined here, but could support
the idea that a larger discourse, either in one's network, or in the
mainstream, could be shaping perceptions of bias.
Furthermore, discrepancies in the literature regarding the
extent to which bias exists may be definitional , a context that
apparently affects the general public as well. For example, Dalton et al. ( 1998) and Kahn and Kenney (2002) argue that in campaigns, it is common for one side to receive more favorable
coverage due to how the campaign is being run. They suggest
this is not bias per se, but objective reporting. These results show
that definitional problems not only affect researchers, but the
public as well.
The finding of a perception of bias when content is disparate
regardless of the objectivity of the actual message is particularly
important in light of the "horserace" type of coverage given to
most electoral campaigns and the ongoing national concern with
objective political reporting. Determining the implications of this
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finding when coverage is perceived to be biased requires further
examination of the affects of bias perceptions on outcomes (e.g.,
candidate support and voting decisions). In the present study, the
results reveal a perception of bias in disparate messages that also
affect perceptions of journalistic fairness. The question remains
as to whether media consumers are less likely to use such information in forming their candidate evaluations.
The results also suggest that respondents are able to decipher
actual media messages, even if the messages favor one side, and
are able to evaluate them accordingly. If this is true, media bias
might not have any effect on evaluations by the public. Accurate
recognition shows that people can assess the leanings of the
press, and if so, media bias might not be capable of shaping
opinions. Voters might actually be shrewd consumers of the news
and ignore what they might feel is biased, according to selective
perception and exposure, which is beyond the scope of this project. Respondents were randomly assigned via computer one article to read and were not able to choose among different articles
and sources, as we would find in the real world. Given the abundance of media outlets to choose from, the public can be selective in tuning in to certain sources that tit their predispositions.
Overall, the results provide evidence that individuals perceive media bias, including when political coverage is disparate.
However, the hostile media effect cannot be used to fully exp lain
these results. The results suggest that individuals respond to media messages with the assumption of bias, but not of bias linked
to partisanship. Instead, the data seem to indicate a tendency for
media consumers to project bias onto a source when the message
is disparate. I refrained from calling these articles biased because
there are objective reasons why a disparity can exist. However,
partisans did assume disparity equated to bias. The public and
the media may have different definitions of what constitutes media bias in a discourse that predisposes individuals to assume
TlfE JOURNAL
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bias . Accordingly, researchers need to consider the effects of
public discourse on information processing and try to understand
the extent to which partisanship affects the calculations. Researchers also need to consider definitions of media bias, examine if the public uses different definitions, and determine what
affect the differences may have on political decision-making.
The present results suggest factors other than partisanship explain how 65 percent of the American public report perceptions
of a media bias, even when actual content is neutral.
APPENDIX A
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND TONE

t. Disparate Content: Positive Content for the Democratic candidate,
negative content for the Republican candidate.
Denver, CO. May, 15, 2001. In his bid for the U.S. Senate, Democratic
Candidate Andrew Pierce refuses political action committee money to promote
an image of independence from special interests. "I'm not bankrolled by the
special interests," Pierce told a crowd in kicking off his fall campaign against
Republican William Jackson . "I haven't accepted a dime of PAC money in this
race . And I'd like to rally you to join me in taking power back from the special
interests who call the shots ."
Pierce used to take money from PACs-more than $ 2.5 million from
1987 to 1995. according to FEC records . But several years ago he decided to
stop taking PAC money, and he has made bashing special-interest dollars a
central theme of his current campaign . Pierce was one of about a dozen House
Democrats to buck their leadership to force a vote on a campaign finance reform bill in 1998. "He has been the real deal in fighting for refom1." said Donald J. Simon, general counsel of Common Cause , a liberal watchdog group
headquartered in Washington, D.C. •' H's as genuine as they come on Capitol
Hill.''
Republican Candidate William Jackson also claims to not having ties to
special interests . However, an examination of Jackson's campaign donations
over the years shows how difficult it can be to completely disengage from what
he calls "the potentially corrupting system." Jackson has raised more than $13
million during his political career. mostly the traditional way : by dialing for
dollars, mixing with well-heeled donors, and accepting contributions from
members of special-interest groups . I !is largest sources of political donations
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are banks and financial services fim1s,which have had a keen interest in him as
a member of the House Banking and Finance Committee. According to a Times
analysis or Federal Election Commission records, lawyers and lobbyists are
also among his most frequent contributors. as arc doctors and computerindustry executives.
Jackson's donor list is not surprising. given that he represents a large
swath of Silicon Valley. A lawyer for investment bankers helped him draft
legislation that would benefit large financial concems in the valley. and two
physicians who donated to his previous campaigns convinced him to introduce
a bill giving doctors more power in negotiations with HMOs.
2. Dispa.-ate Content: Positive Content for the Republican candidate, negative content for the Democratic candidate.

See above story and substitute the Republican candidate for all or the previously positive statements for the Democratic candidate, and substitute the Democratic candidate for all of the previously negative comments toward the
Republican candidate.
3. Balanced Content: Positive Content for both the Democratic and Republican candidates.
Denver, CO. May, 15, 2001. In his bid for the U.S. Senate. Democratic
candidate Andrew Pierce refuses political action committee money in order to
promote an image of independence. "I'm not bankrolled by special interests,"
he told a crowd when kicking o!This fall can1paignagainst William Jackson. "I
haven't accepted a dime of PAC money in this race. And I'd like to rally you to
join me in taking power back from the special interests who call the shots."
Republican candidate Jackson also claims to not being tied to special interests. An examination of Jackson's campaign donations over the years shows
that it has not been difficult for him to disengage from what he calls "the potentially corrupting system." He has raised more than $ I 3 million during his political career, mostly in the traditional ways of dialing for dollars and mixing
with well-heeled donors, without accepting contributions from members of
special interest groups.
Both candidates have previously accepted PAC money, but in recent years
they have made clean breaks from the influence of special interests. According
to FEC records, Pierce accepted more than $ 2.5 million from PACs between
1987 and 1995. However, he decided to stop taking PAC money several years
ago, and has made special-interest dollar bashing a central theme in his campaign. Pierce was one of about a dozen House Democrats to buck their own
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kadership to lorcc a vote on a campaign finance reform bill in 1998. "lie has
been the real deal in lighting for refom1," said Donalu J. Simon. general counsd of Common Cause, a liberal watchdog group hcadquanered in Washington.
D.C. "lle's as genuine as they come on Capitol Hill."
Republican Jackson has also sponsored legislation to reform campaign
finance rules and to maintain distance between Congress and special interests.
I !is stateu goal is to eliminate the amount of PAC money contributed and accepted at election time and lo make it easier for candidates to raise money
without being influenced by special interests.
4. Balanced Content: Negative Content for both Democratic and Republican candidates.
Denver, CO. May, IS, 2001. In his bid for the U.S. Senate, Republican
candidate William Jackson reli.tsespolitical action committee money in order to
promote an image or independence. "I'm not bankrolled by special interests."
he told a crowd when kicking off his fall campaign against Democratic candiuate Andrew Pierce.
Pierce also claims to not being tied to special interests. "I haven't accepted
a <limeof PAC money in this race. And I'd like to rally you to join me in taking
power back from the special interests who call the shots."
1lowever, an examination of both candidates' campaign donations over the
)Cars shows how difficult it can be to completely disengage from what Pierce
calls "the potentially corrupting system." Pierce has raised more than $ 13 million <luringhis political career. mostly the traditional way: by dialing for dollars, mixing with well-heeled dc,nors, and accepting contributions from
members of special interest groups. His largest sources of political donations
are banks and tinaneial linns that have a keen interest in him as a member of
the House Banking and Finance Committee. According to a Times analysis of
Federal Election Commission records, lawyers and lobbyists are among his
most frequent contributors, as are doctors and computer-industry executives.
Similarly, FEC records show that Jackson has previously accepted large
amounts or money from PACs-more than $ 2.5 million between 1987 and
1995. The individuals on Jackson's donor list should not be surprising, given
that his district covers a large swath of Silicon Valley. For example. a lawyer
for investment bankers helped him drafl legislation that would benefit Silicon
Valley financial titans. and two physicians who had donated to his campaign
convinced him to introduce a bill giving doctors more power in negotiations
with IIMOs.
According to their individual records, both candidates are quick to deny
being bought by special interests. but in the past they have been quick to accept
money from PACs when offered.
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